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ARTICLE

Accurate Economics to Protect Endangered
Species and their Critical Habitats
JACOB P. BYL*
Federal agencies currently use a methodology that finds
negligible benefits of protecting critical habitat for endangered
species, despite the prime real estate that is often involved. The
Endangered Species Act already calls for economic analysis, but
agencies currently treat it as a meaningless hoop to jump through.
Agencies justify this hollow exercise by pointing to the difficulty in
quantifying the increment of added protection that comes with
critical habitat designation. However, the increment of added
protection for critical habitat can be measured using methods
already employed by agencies in other environmental analyses.
Although the central benefits of critical habitat are improvements
to the condition of listed species, accurate economic analysis
should also consider the broad benefits of ecosystem services that
flow from protected areas to human populations. I propose that
agencies use a methodology that weighs the estimated burdens on
regulated parties against the estimated benefits of designating
lands as critical habitat. My proposed—more accurate—analysis
can lead to more effective implementation of the Endangered
Species Act by allowing agencies to target limited resources to
projects that offer high net conservation benefits. I use a recent
cost-benefit analysis for loggerhead turtles to demonstrate that the
benefits of conserving habitat include increased protection of the
species as well as a larger flow of ecosystem services amounting to
at least $106 million per year in benefits, not the $0 estimate that
federal agencies have arrived at. Accurate economic analysis
*

Assistant Professor of Economics at Western Kentucky University, 1906
College Heights Blvd. #11059, Bowling Green, KY 42101-1059 (e-mail:
jacob.byl@wku.edu). I would like to thank J.B. Ruhl, Kip Viscusi, Cindy
Kam, Kathy Anderson, and Owen Jones for valuable comments.
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provides useful information to agencies and the public in a way
that can improve discussions that are often one-sided because of
an emphasis on regulatory costs with little discussion of
regulatory benefits.
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INTRODUCTION

The beaches of Cape Hatteras stretch for miles. Strips of
natural sand flank rolling dunes that offer countless vistas of
ocean and shore. The beautiful coastal islands in North Carolina
are a destination for sun-seeking vacationers from across the
United States. The beaches of Cape Hatteras also attract another
type of visitor: loggerhead turtles travel hundreds of miles to lay
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their eggs in the sand of these beaches. In fact, without sandy
beaches like these, sea turtles are unable to reproduce. And sea
turtles are not the only nonhuman residents at Cape Hatteras—
the complex ecosystem where the ocean meets the shore is
essential to a wide array of species. Yet according to a recent
economic analysis commissioned by the National Marine
Fisheries Service, the benefits of designating Cape Hatteras as
critical habitat for the loggerhead turtle are difficult to measure,
but approximately zero.1 And the analysis covers more than the
coastal islands of North Carolina—most of the ocean beaches in
the southeast United States, from Cape Hatteras down to Key
West, Florida and over to Gulf Shores, Alabama are estimated to
provide zero benefits as critical habitat.2 As described below,
current agency practice does not provide useful information to the
agency or to the public—an analysis that shows no meaningful
benefits or costs of designating a good portion of the East Coast
oceanfront property as critical habitat is not an accurate
economic analysis.
In this Article, I describe how proper economic tools can help
protect critical habitat for endangered species while lowering
burdens on regulated parties. The use of economic tools is called
for in the current language of the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”), so agencies can embrace the move toward more effective
regulations without waiting for Congress to amend the statute. In
this Article, I call for the agencies implementing the ESA to make
the move to more accurate economic analysis by quantifying the
real costs and benefits of critical habitat designation. In doing so,
agencies should recognize that protections for loggerhead turtles
are about more than the turtles—benefits of critical habitat stem
from protecting the surrounding ecosystem as well as from the
endangered species itself.
The ESA is a powerful environmental law that was passed in
1973 with the purpose of protecting “the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend.”3 To achieve
1.

INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION
OF MARINE HABITAT FOR THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC OCEAN DISTINCT
POPULATION SEGMENT OF THE LOGGERHEAD TURTLE 7-2 (2014),
https://perma.cc/X93G-GAE3
[hereinafter
LOGGERHEAD
ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS].

2.
3.

See id. at 6-15.
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018).
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this purpose, Congress delegated authority to the Fish and
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) (within the Department of the Interior)
and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) (within the
Department of Commerce) to regulate public and private parties
that engage in activities that affect endangered and threatened
species.4 The FWS and NMFS work to protect imperiled species
by going through regulatory steps to determine whether the
species warrant protection by being listed as endangered or
threatened. For species that are listed, the agencies implement
the statutory provisions that provide legal protections to
threatened and endangered species. One of the major regulatory
steps that the FWS and NMFS take to protect listed species is to
designate critical habitat for those species. Critical habitat
designation is done by the FWS and NMFS “on the basis of the
best scientific data available and after taking into consideration
the economic impact, the impact on national security, and any
other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical
habitat.”5
The requirement to take “into consideration the economic
impact” of critical habitat designation differs from the section of
the ESA that calls for the FWS and NMFS to list species as
endangered or threatened based “solely on the best scientific
data . . . available.”6 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted
“best scientific data available” to mean that economic analysis
should not have any role in the listing decision.7 So the FWS and
NMFS are charged with listing species as endangered or
threatened without engaging in economic analysis but are
supposed to consider economic factors when designating critical
habitat.

4.

5.
6.
7.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2018). The FWS has authority over species on
land and in freshwater. The NMFS has authority over marine species. The
two agencies have joint authority over species that spend part of their time
in marine environments and part of their time on land or in freshwater.
See Species Information, NOAA FISHERIES, https://perma.cc/N4R2-VXT6
(last updated Jan. 29, 2018).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2018).
See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–88 (1978) (discussing
that Congress “viewed the value of endangered species as ‘incalculable’”
and enacted the ESA to combat species extinction, “whatever the cost”).
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Thus far, FWS and NMFS have performed economic analysis
of critical habitat designation by looking at the change from the
“baseline” of protections for listed species.8 In practice, this has
led to economic analysis that weighs low benefits against low
costs because the protections afforded by critical habitat largely
overlap with the protections for listed species. In most cases, the
FWS and NMFS estimate benefits of proposed critical habitat as
zero and costs as limited to some thousands of dollars per year for
administrative costs.9 Commentators, such as Professor Amy
Sinden, have argued that a lack of extensive economic analysis is
a good thing because more elaborate weighing of costs and
benefits of critical habitat would use agency resources and may
result in regulatory paralysis.10
I propose that more accurate economic analysis of critical
habitat designation should instead weigh the broad benefits
against the real costs of critical habitat. There are two main
reasons why economic analysis should play more of a role in
critical habitat decisions. First, statutory interpretation of the
ESA points to a Congressional intent that would be best fulfilled
with more accurate economic analysis. I define accurate economic
analysis as the weighing of costs against benefits of proposed
regulations, with measurements of costs and benefits that reflect
social values of the expected changes due to the proposed policies.
In Part II, I discuss statutory interpretation of the ESA to
attempt to discern the intent of Congress when it comes to the
role of economic analysis in critical habitat designation.
The second reason why economic analysis should play a more
active role in the process of designating critical habitat is that
accurate economic analysis can enable ESA regulations to be
more efficient, allowing for more conservation with lower burdens
on regulated parties. In Part III, I describe how cost-benefit
analysis can help lead to win-win results by encouraging more
effective ESA regulations. The expertise of economists can
contribute to the protection of endangered species by focusing

8.
9.
10.

50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (2018).
See LOGGERHEAD ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 3-17, 7-2.
Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in
the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 129, 134 (2004).
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agency resources on the most promising actions that have the
highest net benefits to society.
In Part IV, I turn to methodology for accurately measuring
costs and benefits of critical habitat under the ESA. I pay
particular attention to measuring benefits, which tend to be more
nebulous and difficult to pin down. The current agency estimates
of zero benefits and low costs for critical habitat do not accurately
reflect social preferences. People value preserving rare species
but also value the benefits that flow from the areas protected as
critical habitat. The most promising way to measure these
benefits is by quantifying the values of ecosystem services like
water filtration, carbon sequestration, and recreational
opportunities. I argue that the best methodology for measuring
benefits of critical habitat is to add together the values people
place on: 1) the expected improvements to listed species due to
the critical habitat designation and 2) the value of the ecosystem
services that are also protected due to the critical habitat
designation.
In Part V, I provide an example of how to implement my
proposed economic analysis using the recent economic analysis
for critical habitat designation of the Northwest Atlantic
population segment of the loggerhead turtle. As in most recent
agency analyses, the estimates provided by NMFS in this
analysis are of zero benefits and low costs. By using published
estimates of the values of loggerhead turtles and ecosystem
services that are likely protected by the proposed critical habitat,
I estimate benefits that more accurately reflect the values people
place on the proposed action of designating critical habitat along
a major portion of the East Coast of the United States.
In Part VI, I conclude by discussing how more accurate
economic analysis of critical habitat designation has the potential
to change the dynamics of the oft-lively debate between
supporters and opponents of the ESA. With things like timber
harvests and construction development at play, there are billions
of dollars of economic activity at stake.11 Industries that face
regulation under the ESA are quick to discuss how much
economic value is lost from restrictions on timber harvest in the
11.

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: SAVING HABITATS,
PROTECTING HOMES 135 (Jason Shogren ed., 1999) [hereinafter PRIVATE
PROPERTY & THE ESA].
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Pacific Northwest, solar power in the Mojave desert, or water
distribution in California.12 These quantified estimates lead to
press coverage and statistics quoted on Capitol Hill.13 On the
other side of the conservation debate, proponents of more
stringent endangered species protections talk mostly in moral
terms about the importance of protecting species like the grey
wolf and Karner blue butterfly.14 Although these justifications for
conservation resonate with some audiences, moral arguments
tend to provide few quotable statistics and get less press
coverage. By engaging in more accurate economic analysis, the
FWS and NMFS can help reframe the debate by providing
credible statistics for both sides.
At the heart of the endangered species controversies are
difficult tradeoffs between conserving rare ecosystems and
developing resources in ways that affect quality of life for millions
of people. By sidestepping these tradeoffs in economic analysis,
the agencies implementing the ESA miss out on an opportunity to
target conservation efforts more effectively. Economic analysis
can help the agencies improve the effectiveness of conservation
efforts in ways that lead to win-win situations compared with the
current regime. Accurate economic analyses can foster more
balanced discussions of conservation controversies in ways that
allow for better public involvement and, ultimately, more
effective endangered species protections.
II. INTERPRETING THE ESA’S CALL FOR
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The ESA requires economic analysis for critical habitat
designation, and the current practices of the agencies that
12.

13.

14.

See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059
(9th Cir. 2004) (Northern spotted owls); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 746 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (desert
tortoises); In re Consol. Delta Smelt Cases, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (E.D. Cal.
2011) (delta smelt).
See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Ideas and Trends; The Battle for the National
Forests, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 1989) https://perma.cc/D4VW-L57C
(reporting on expected costs of spotted owl regulations); see also 111 CONG.
REC. 5964 (2010) (power company executives testifying about the
quantified costs of endangered species regulation for H.R. 221).
See
Protecting
Imperiled
Species,
DEFENDERS
OF
WILDLIFE,
https://perma.cc/A682-KFNU.
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implement the ESA follow the letter, rather than the spirit, of the
law. This Part considers different interpretations of the ESA and
finds that the one that best fits Congress’s intent is to have the
FWS and NMFS engage in cost-benefit analysis that considers
the broad benefits and real costs of critical habitat designations.
A.

The Statute and Context

The ESA was passed in 1973 to provide “a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved” and to “provide a program for
the conservation of such endangered species and threatened
species.”15 The ESA requires agencies to use the “best scientific
and commercial data available” when determining whether to list
species as threatened or endangered.16 In Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this language
signified that Congress did not intend for agencies to consider
economic factors when deciding whether to list species under the
ESA.17 Congress endorsed this interpretation of the ESA by
adding “solely” in front of “scientific and commercial data” to
make it clear that the listing decision for species should not
include economic factors.18
Congress was also sensitive to the backlash against the
decision in Tennessee Valley Authority because many people saw
it as wasteful to prevent use of the nearly completed $100 million
Tellico dam for the sake of a commercially worthless fish.19 So
Congress passed a law explicitly exempting the Tellico dam from
the ESA and started engaging in discussions about how the ESA
should be amended.20 In 1978, Congress amended the ESA to
require the implementing agencies to designate critical habitat
based on the “best scientific data available and after taking into
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2018).
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–85 (1978).
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304,
§ 2(a)(2), 96 Stat. 1411, 1411 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(1)(A) (2018)); H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 12 (1982).
See James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under
the Endangered Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 318–19, 321
(1990).
Id.
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consideration the economic impact . . . of specifying any particular
area as critical habitat.”21 The 1978 amendments to the ESA also
added a committee that has authority to exempt certain activities
from ESA regulations to prevent drastic outcomes like that in
Tennessee Valley Authority.22 This “God Squad” committee is
usually described as an escape valve intended to prevent repeats
of the Tellico dam situation.23
B. Agency and Court Interpretations
As it has stood for over thirty years, the ESA allows for no
role of economic analysis in the process of listing a species as
threatened or endangered, but the statute requires the FWS and
NMFS to engage in economic analysis when designating critical
habitat of listed species.24 The FWS and NMFS have interpreted
“taking into consideration the economic impact” in critical habitat
designation as a call for analysis of the additional protections of
critical habitat designation over the protections afforded to listed
species.25 Species listed as endangered or threatened are
protected from “take” by any person or organization and from
“jeopardy” by federal agencies.26 The FWS and NMFS consider
these protections to be a baseline, since economic factors are not
supposed to be considered at the listing stage.27 Critical habitat
adds a protection that federal agencies may not engage in
“adverse modification of habitat . . . that is deemed to be
critical.”28 As defined by the agencies in regulations, the
prohibitions on take and jeopardy almost completely overlap with
the adverse modification protection of critical habitat.29 Using
this interpretation of the statute, economic analysis is
implemented using an “incremental” approach that looks at the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1536(e).
Salzman, supra note 19, at 321.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018).
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revisions to the
Regulations for Impact Analyses of Critical Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058,
53,062 (Aug. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Critical Habitat Regulations
Revisions].
16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1)(B) (2018).
Critical Habitat Regulations Revisions, 78 Fed. Reg. at 53,062.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018).
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2018).
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benefits and costs of the added protections of critical habitat over
the protections that come from listing a species as endangered or
threatened.30
As a practical matter, the incremental approach leads to a
narrow concept of costs and benefits because there is usually no
additional increment of legal protection for critical habitat that
was not already covered by the take and jeopardy protections of
listing.31 Costs are usually limited to the administrative costs of
handling critical habitat.32 Benefits are usually negligible and
often left unquantified but, when quantified, are usually zero.33
From a logistical standpoint, this allows the FWS and NMFS to
avoid using extensive agency resources on economic analysis.34
The incremental approach to cost-benefit analysis was
challenged in New Mexico Cattle Growers Association v. U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Service, prompting the Tenth Circuit to review the
FWS’s interpretation of the call for economic analysis in the
ESA.35 In New Mexico Cattle Growers, the court rejected the
agency’s incremental approach for taking too narrow a view of the
costs and benefits of critical habitat.36 According to the New
Mexico Cattle Growers court, the narrow costs and benefits
implied by the incremental approach went against Congress’
intent for the FWS to use economic analysis for critical habitat
designation.37 The FWS interpretation was not afforded
substantial deference because the policy had not been
implemented through notice-and-comment rulemaking.38

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. § 424.19(b).
See Sinden, supra note 10, at 151. The one scenario in which critical
habitat may add an additional layer of protection over listing protections is
when areas that do not currently serve as habitat for listed species are
designated as critical habitat for those species. This could be the case if
part of the historic range of a species is designated even though it is not
currently inhabited by the species. The FWS and NMFS avoid doing this to
prevent added controversy. Id.
See, e.g., LOGGERHEAD ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 5-1.
See, e.g., id. at 7-2.
See Sinden, supra note 10, at 208.
See generally New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1283–85 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1285.
Id.
Id. at 1281.
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However, in Arizona Cattle Growers Association v. Salazar,
the Ninth Circuit upheld FWS’s use of the incremental approach
as a permissible reading of the ESA.39 When the Arizona Cattle
Growers court interpreted the ESA, it found the incremental
approach to be a permissible reading of the statute’s call for
economic analysis.40 So judicial reviews of the agency
interpretation of economic analysis in the ESA have gone both
ways, leading to a patchwork of permissible economic analysis for
endangered species that required different methodologies in
Arizona and New Mexico.41
In an attempt to achieve a uniform national policy, the FWS
and NMFS promulgated a joint rule in 2013 officially interpreting
the ESA and used the “incremental” approach with narrowly
defined costs and benefits.42 The new policy was promulgated by
notice-and-comment rulemaking, so it will presumably receive
deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
which stands for the idea that courts defer to reasonable agency
interpretations when those interpretations were made with the
force of law.43 This means that the New Mexico Cattle Growers
case would likely come out differently today because the court
would give substantial deference to the agency now that the
incremental approach has gone through notice-and-comment
rulemaking.44 Although the FWS and NMFS have used
rulemaking to interpret the ESA to call for economic analysis
using the incremental approach, that does not have to be the end
of the discussion; there are multiple perspectives on the statutory

39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

See generally Arizona Cattle Growers Association v. Salazar, 606 F.3d
1160, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1073 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the Tenth Circuit’s
holding). Arizona is in the Ninth Circuit, so the FWS would be allowed to
use the incremental approach there. New Mexico is in the Tenth Circuit, so
the FWS could not use the incremental approach in the neighboring state.
This can be a major problem for the FWS when trying to designate critical
habitat for species that cross state lines in those circuits.
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revisions to the
Regulations for Impact Analyses of Critical Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058
(Aug. 28, 2013) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424).
See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001).
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language, and the agencies could opt to promulgate new rules
with different interpretations in the future.
C. Interpretations by Commentators
Various commentators outside the agencies and courts have
also interpreted the ESA’s call for economic analysis of critical
habitat designation. Many environmental advocates have
interpreted the economic analysis provision along the lines of the
incremental approach and have applauded the evasion of more
involved cost-benefit analysis, as they see the lack of economic
analysis in the ESA as one of the law’s strengths in protecting the
environment.45 In this view, the incremental approach allows the
agencies to bypass costly analysis that is often a hurdle for new
regulations to cross.46 Resources that would have to be spent
putting prices on things that are inherently valuable can instead
be used to “put boots on the ground” to actively conserve listed
species.
Professor Amy Sinden argues that it is desirable for the
agencies to use “short-cut environmental standards” for economic
analysis so that cost-benefit analysis does not have to play a role
in the ESA.47 Examples of short-cut methods include feasibility
standards and limited balancing tests found in the Clean Air Act
and Clean Water Act.48 Sinden argues that Congress intended
these short-cut methods in lieu of formal cost-benefit analysis.49
The ESA calls for “consideration [of] . . . economic impact” and
also charges the FWS and NMFS to consider other relevant
factors “based on such data as may be available at the time.”50
Sinden reads this language as an intent to give the agencies
implementing the law substantial flexibility in how they engage
in economic analysis of critical habitat designation so that the
agencies can act quickly.51 Formal economic analysis uses
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 10, at 159 (describing environmental groups’
successful legal challenges to FWS’s declining to designate critical habitat
based on cost-benefit analysis).
See id.
Id. at 184–87.
Id. at 186, 188–92.
See id. at 210.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2), (6)(C)(ii) (2018).
See Sinden, supra note 10, at 193–94.
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substantial resources and is often cited as an excuse for
administrative paralysis, so Professor Sinden prefers an ESA that
retains an element of absolutist methods to achieve its goals.52
In a similar vein, Jon Souder traces the use of economic
analysis for ESA regulations and proposes that critical habitat
designation should go through the public comment process
spelled out in the National Environmental Protection Act.53
Souder argues that this public involvement is preferable to formal
cost-benefit analysis of endangered species regulations.54
D. The Closest Fit to Congressional Intent
The current agency interpretation takes the prohibition on
economic analysis for listing species as a signal to start the
economic analysis of critical habitat designation from a baseline
with the species already listed and protected through those legal
mechanisms.55 But the relationship between listing and
designating critical habitat is more complex than baseline
protections and additional protections.56 Designating critical
habitat is required for listed species.57 There are many overlaps
in the protections, and the legal protections of critical habitat are
often the ones that have bite in practice.58
When Congress included the requirement for agencies to
consider economic factors in the critical habitat designation
process, it is unlikely that the added requirement was intended to
be a hollow bureaucratic hurdle.59 If Congress intended economic
analysis the way the FWS and NMFS interpret it, then the
requirement to consider economic factors is surplusage—at least
52.
53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 192–94.
See Jon A. Souder, Chasing Armadillos Down Yellow Lines: Economics in
the Endangered Species Act, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1095, 1097–98, 1109,
1112–13, 1138 (1993) (arguing that the public comment process
established under NEPA should be used for critical habitat designation to
supplement a weak cost-benefit analysis).
Id. at 1138.
See LOGGERHEAD ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 2-7.
See Salzman, supra note 19, at 321–23.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2018).
See Salzman, supra note 19, at 323–27.
See generally id. at 316–21 (describing public outcry in the wake of TVA v.
Hill and Congress’s adoption of cost-benefit analysis for critical-habitat
designation in response).
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for practical purposes. This is because an economic analysis that
weighs no benefits against almost no costs for all proposed critical
habitat designations does not provide helpful insight into any of
those designations; when there is no variation across proposed
designations, there is nothing informative about whether some
proposals are preferable to others.60
In the wake of Tennessee Valley Authority, it is more likely
that Congress intended to amend the ESA by adding a method to
address the important tradeoff between conservation and
economic development.61 The requirement to consider economic
factors when designating critical habitat can serve, like the “God
Squad,” as an escape valve from drastic outcomes like the Tellico
Dam.62
Congressional intent behind the call for economic analysis in
critical habitat designation under the ESA can be discerned by
considering the context of the 1978 amendments to the ESA and
the timeline of agency actions. In the wake of Tennessee Valley
Authority, Congress was explicit about economic analysis not
playing a role in the listing process that, as described above,
affords protections to species against take and agency actions
that involve jeopardy.63 At the same time, Congress explicitly
called for economic analysis of critical habitat designation, which
protects against agency actions that may adversely modify
habitat.64
The FWS and NMFS have interpreted jeopardy and adverse
modification to mean similar things, although that is not the only

60.

61.

62.
63.
64.

See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing economic analysis done under
the baseline approach as “rendered essentially without meaning . . . “
because the agencies defined critical-habitat protection against adverse
modification as fully encompassed by listing protection against jeopardy
for all species).
See id. at 320–21 (noting that the cost-benefit provision “changed the
designation process from a purely biological assessment to a social policy
decision” and that the newly created “God Squad” could exempt projects
from § 7 if it determines, inter alia, that the action’s societal benefits
outweigh the costs of species preservation).
See id.
Id. at 323.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018).
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reasonable interpretation of those terms.65 But even taking those
terms as identical, it could still make sense for Congress to
simultaneously call for no economic analysis when listing species
yet for meaningful economic analysis when designating critical
habitat. If Congress felt that economic factors were important but
should be considered at a later stage and should focus on agency
behavior, it would make sense to exempt listing from economic
analysis but call for it in critical habitat designation. This
interpretation avoids the need to perform economic analysis
before listing, which might be important when the agency is
trying to quickly protect a species, such as after an imperiled
species has just been discovered and is under great threat.66 Once
species have some protections in place, Congress may have
wanted the agencies to then turn to economic factors. Focusing on
federal agency behavior also allows the FWS and NMFS to
sidestep trying to quantify some of the thorny issues involved in
private landowner restrictions.67 Under this reading of the ESA,
when rare species are discovered they are quickly listed and
receive legal protections while the agencies engage in scientific
research to determine the conservation needs of the species. The
FWS and NMFS then decide where to designate critical habitat,
which has a direct impact on federal agencies but not on private
landowners, based on economic factors.
As mentioned above, Professor Sinden has argued for the
benefits of eschewing cost-benefit analysis when designating
critical habitat in favor of short-cut environmental standards.68
However, Professor Sinden’s interpretation fails to give full effect
to Congress’s call for economic analysis. The language that she
cites as “evidencing Congress’s conscious decision to choose
prompt agency action over regulatory perfection”69 is in a portion
of the statute that describes a one-year delay in implementation
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.

See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n, 248 F.3d at 1285. One could easily
imagine definitions of jeopardy and adverse modification that differ in
levels of protection, which types of species are targeted, or other
substantive differences.
This was essentially the situation with the snail darter fish that held up
operation of the Tellico Dam in Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978).
See PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE ESA, supra note 11, at 55.
See Sinden, supra note 10, at 196–97.
Id. at 194.

15

2018]

Accurate Economics to Protect Endangered Species

323

of the law to give FWS and NMFS an opportunity to meet the
statutory deadlines for critical habitat designation.70 Thus, the
charge that the FWS “must publish a final regulation[ ] based on
such data as may be available at the time”71 is not strong
evidence that Congress intended for the agencies to always prefer
regulatory speed to regulatory effectiveness. Following the
principle that courts should interpret statutory terms “in
connection with . . . the whole statute,”72 it is natural to read
language in that portion of the statute about a one-year delay as
describing how the agencies should proceed during the one-year
delay. Taking language from that portion of the statute and
applying it to other sections of the ESA is stripping it of the
context of commanding agencies how to implement the law
during its nascent year.
Additionally, the language describing the criteria for criticalhabitat designation is very similar to the language that describes
the criteria for listing species.73 When considering this language
within the whole ESA, there is a conflict if the language indicates
Congress’s intent for short-cut economic analysis of critical
habitat designation—which is Professor Sinden’s preferred
interpretation—but Congress uses the same language to show
that there should be no role for economic analysis in the listing
process.74 The U.S. Supreme Court, endorsed by Congress, has
read the language in the listing process to mean that economics
has no role in the listing decision, so it would be incongruous to
have similar language used as a signal for short-cut economic
analysis.
Interpreting “consideration of economic factors” in the ESA
as a call for cost-benefit analysis is a better way to give effect to
the intent of Congress to use economic tools as a factor in the
decision to designate critical habitat. As discussed above, the
current agency interpretation—the incremental approach—does
not lead to economic analysis being a meaningful factor in critical
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2018).
Id.
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1856)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (establishing the species listing criteria)
with 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (establishing the critical-habitat designation
criteria).
See discussion supra Part II.
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habitat decisions because the results are always estimates of
costs that are relatively low administrative costs weighed against
approximately zero benefits.75 It is unlikely that Congress
intended this result when it called for economic analysis. Instead,
congressional intent points to a need for more accurate economic
analysis. By measuring costs and benefits using estimates of how
much people trade off environmental amenities for other things
like money, the agency is able to pursue regulatory policies that
best reflect societal values.76 With accurate measurements of
costs and benefits, economic analysis can serve as the escape
valve that Congress likely had in mind in the wake of the Tellico
Dam experience.77 In addition to following with the intent of
Congress, more accurate economic analysis can improve over the
current approach by leading toward more effective ESA
regulations.
E.

How to Measure the Increment

Accurate economic analysis requires a way to measure the
costs and benefits of critical habitat designation in relation to the
protections against take and jeopardy that come from the listing
of species. The current agency methodology assumes that the
increment of protection for critical habitat is essentially zero
because the adverse modification protection completely overlaps
with either the Section 7 protection against jeopardy, the Section
9 protection against take, or both.78 However, there are other
ways to measure the increment of protection from adverse
modification that would give meaning to the language Congress
included in the ESA to consider economic factors of critical
habitat designation.
1.

Nonoverlapping Protection of Adverse Modification

Courts have hypothesized that there can be scenarios in
which critical habitat designation provides protections for species
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Sinden, supra note 10, at 196–97.
NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 148 (2008).
Salzman, supra note 19, at 320–21.
See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001).
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that would not come from jeopardy and take protections.79 When
areas are considered “essential to the conservation” of listed
species, but those areas are not currently inhabited by the
species, there may be an increment of protection added by
designating that land as critical habitat.80 FWS and NMFS
acknowledge this possibility in economic analyses, even when
they choose not to designate any land that is not currently
occupied by the species.81 By doing this, the agencies are able to
pay tribute to the idea that Congress intended for meaningful
economic analysis of critical-habitat designation, but argue that it
does not apply in this particular designation. But as this appears
to have become standard procedure for the agencies,82
congressional intent for economic analysis of critical habitat
designation is still not being met with meaningful agency action.
2.

Adverse Modification Protection in Isolation

The New Mexico Cattle Growers court required FWS to
measure costs and benefits of critical habitat even if those costs
and benefits also accrued from the protections for listed species.83
This essentially asks the agencies to pretend that jeopardy and
take protections do not exist and measure how critical habitat
79.
80.

81.

82.

83.

See Cape Hatteras Access Pres. All. v. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d
108, 129-30 (D.D.C. 2004).
See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (2018) (defining “critical habitat” to include
“areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species . . . upon a
determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the
conservation of the species”).
See, e.g. INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT
DESIGNATION FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL 8-13 (2012),
https://perma.cc/5CV6-Z2EV [hereinafter NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL
ANALYSIS]; CARDNO ENTRIX, DRAFT REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW OF CRITICAL
HABITAT DESIGNATION FOR THE ARTIC RINGED SEAL (2014),
https://perma.cc/6AA8-PT7U. But see Markle Interests, LLC v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, 827 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2016) (cert petition pending)
(discussing FWS designation of unoccupied critical habitat for the dusky
gopher frog).
See, e.g., INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT
DESIGNATION FOR THE ROSWELL SPRINGSNAIL, KOSTER’S SPRINGSNAIL, PECOS
ASSIMINEA, AND NOEL’S AMPHIPOD ES-1 (2011), https://perma.cc/AVN3N9FG; INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT
DESIGNATION FOR THE GUNNISON SAGE GROUSE ES-2 (2014),
https://perma.cc/PY2L-7E98 [hereinafter IEC GUNNISON SAGE GROUSE].
See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001).
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designation affects behavior. There are two major challenges to
this approach. First, measuring the costs and benefits of a
proposed action in a vacuum goes against the White House
guidance to measure costs and benefits of a proposed action
against a baseline of what would occur if that action were not
taken.84 As such, the methodology for economic analysis of
critical-habitat designation would differ in a major way from
those used in economic analysis of other major agency actions.
The second major challenge to measuring costs and benefits
of critical habitat in isolation is that it would be hard to
implement. Species are always listed prior to or concurrently with
critical habitat designation, so there are no examples of areas
with the adverse modification protection but not the jeopardy and
take protections. This makes it impossible to directly measure
how the adverse modification protection in isolation affects
behavior in the real world. The FWS has attempted to satisfy the
New Mexico Cattle Growers court by augmenting the standard
economic analysis of critical habitat designation with additional
information about the estimated costs and benefits of the
“baseline,” namely the jeopardy and take protections that come
with listing the species.85 By doing this, FWS has been able to
satisfy the court’s requirement to provide a broader picture of the
costs and benefits of ESA protections while continuing to focus on
the incremental analysis it uses in other circuits. With the legal
and practical challenges associated with measuring the effects of
critical habitat in isolation, it is unlikely that this methodology
will reemerge in the near future now that FWS has promulgated
the 2013 rule specifying the incremental method as the preferred
approach to economic analysis.
3.

Indirect Effects of Critical Habitat

A third way to measure the increment of protection for
critical habitat is to estimate how much adverse modification
protection will affect behavior by looking at empirical evidence of
how people respond to critical habitat designation. As discussed
above, people care about critical habitat designation in ways that
suggest there are real-world consequences of these actions. When
84.
85.

See infra Part III.
See, e.g., IEC GUNNISON SAGE GROUSE, supra note 82, at 2-2.
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engaging in Section 7 consultations for the ESA, the FWS and
NMFS estimate what indirect effects the action may have on
listed species.86 Indirect effects are things that are “reasonably
certain to occur” because of an action.87 So if the Federal
Highway Administration is consulting with the FWS about
building a new highway that will run near an endangered frog’s
habitat, the agencies estimate how much the frog will be affected
directly by road construction and indirectly by development that
is spurred by the new road.
Likewise, agencies are charged with estimating indirect
effects that are “reasonably foreseeable” to occur because of
proposed actions as part of the NEPA review process.88 Indirect
effects include “growth-inducing effects and other effects related
to induced changes in the pattern of land use, population density
or growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other
natural systems, including ecosystems.”89 For example, when the
U.S. Forest Service proposes to lease a plot of land for a new ski
area, the agency considers how the induced growth of new hotels,
retail buildings, and housing outside of Forest Service land will
affect nearby environmental amenities.90
Since the FWS and NMFS already examine what is
reasonably expected to occur because of an action when they
engage in Section 7 consultations and NEPA reviews, the
agencies already have expertise in making these predictions.
Estimating the indirect effects of critical-habitat designation does
not pose the same methodological challenges that plague the
analysis of critical habitat in isolation because there are realworld examples of areas that first have only listing protections

86.
87.

88.
89.
90.

See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02(d) (2018).
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING CONSULTATION
AND CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT 4-29 (1998), https://perma.cc/G748-3EN7.
WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY & CAL. OFFICE OF PLANNING &
RESEARCH, NEPA AND CEQA: INTEGRATING FEDERAL AND STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS 30 (2014), https://perma.cc/NA75-UEVK.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2018).
See, e.g., U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE, BRECKENRIDGE SKI RESORT MULTISEASON RECREATION PROJECTS DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
2-24 (2015), https://perma.cc/9DRN-RTY3.
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and then add the adverse modification protection.91 In fact,
economists have already used situations like these to estimate
how critical habitat affects behavior. As discussed in Section V,
these estimates can be used as a starting point for measuring the
increment of protection that comes from critical habitat
designation.
III. ACCURATE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CAN LEAD TO
MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATIONS
In this Part, I argue that accurate cost-benefit analysis can
help achieve win-win results by allowing for more conservation of
endangered species while also lowering burdens on regulated
parties. I pull from guidance published by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), an office in the
White House that specializes in economic analysis, and draw
comparisons to economic analyses of environmental laws
performed by other agencies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”).
A. Economic Analysis to Promote Effective
Regulations
Economic analysis, often in the form of cost-benefit analysis,
has the potential to make regulations more effective by
encouraging agencies to promulgate rules that have larger
benefits and smaller costs. Both Republican and Democratic
presidents have endorsed the idea that economic analysis is an
important tool for promoting effective regulation.92 Cost-benefit
analysis was originally introduced by the Reagan administration
and has been utilized by every administration since.93 President
Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 calling for cost-benefit
91.

92.
93.

See, e.g., LOGGERHEAD ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at ES-1 (describing
the listing of the loggerhead sea turtle in 1978, but critical habitat
designation not occurring for the Northwest Atlantic Ocean Distinct
Population Segment until 2014); Critical-Habitat Designations for the
Northwest Atlantic Ocean Loggerhead Sea Turtle the North Pacific Ocean
Loggerhead, 79 Fed. Reg. 39,855 (July 10, 2014) (issuing final rule to
designate critical habitat for the Northwest Atlantic loggerhead sea turtle).
LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN, AND KEVIN M. STACK, THE
REGULATORY STATE 483 (2010).
Id.

21

2018]

Accurate Economics to Protect Endangered Species

329

analysis of all major federal agency actions whenever possible.94
Cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations can ensure that the
expected benefits are large enough to justify the expected costs.95
There is not a strict rule that regulations must have positive net
benefits, but net benefit numbers are seen as indicators of how
effectively proposed rules will achieve their regulatory goals.96
The current guidance from OIRA, Circular A-4, explains that
the goal when estimating impacts of regulation is to measure the
entire range of costs and benefits that accrue to people in the
United States from proposed regulations.97 The preferred method
for measuring benefits of regulation is to use measures of what
people are willing to pay for improvements in quality of life.98
Costs are estimated by adding the expected administrative costs
with the additional burdens on regulated parties.99
Cost-benefit analysis can help create win-win situations
because resources can be focused on places where they are most
effective, leading to more of the desired regulatory outcome with
lower costs.100 Circular A-4 explains that the goals of economic
analysis are to “(1) learn if the benefits of an action are likely to
justify the costs or (2) discover which of various possible
alternatives would be the most cost-effective.”101 By choosing the
most cost-effective regulations, agencies are able to achieve better
regulatory results.102
To see how this can lead to a win-win outcome, consider a
hypothetical with an agency that is charged with protecting the
national tree, the oak.103 This agency has the daunting task of
figuring out how to protect a national symbol that is important to
people and ecosystems but that also forms the basis of livelihoods
from forestry to cooperage of wine barrels. Suppose that the
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
Id.
ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 76, at 149.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4
§ E(1) (2003), https://perma.cc/KPV8-M84L [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4].
Id. § E(8).
Id. § E(2).
See id. § A.
Id.
See id.
Press Release, Arbor Day Found., Oak Becomes America’s National Tree
(Dec. 10, 2004), https://perma.cc/C2EN-BDV3.
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agency is interested in pursuing a proposed regulation of X,
where X could stand for improvement of oak savannah habitat or
some other agency action. To assess whether proposed regulation
X to protect oaks is a net benefit to society, the agency can use
economic analysis. Circular A-4 calls for the agency to clearly lay
out alternatives to the proposed regulation—for example, policy Y
that targets improvement of oak savannah habitat on federal
land and policy Z that is a no-action alternative.104 For each of
the alternatives, the agency should calculate the expected costs
and benefits of the action. Once the expected costs are subtracted
from the expected benefits, the agency has an estimate for the net
benefit of each alternative. If the expected net benefit of
regulation X is −$50 million, then the rule may not be in the best
interest of society. If alternative Y has an expected net benefit of
$50 million and alternative Z has an expected net benefit of $0,
then the economic analysis suggests that regulatory policy Y is
the preferred action. Compared with the original proposal of X,
policy Y can offer more effective protection of the oak that results
in more benefits to society at lower costs. By moving forward with
regulations that focus resources where they are most effective,
the agency can do a better job at fulfilling its mandate to protect
our national tree.
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Other Environmental
Regulations
The statutory requirements for the FWS and NMFS to
consider economic factors in critical habitat designation are
similar to the calls for economic analysis in the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act, both drafted and enacted around the same
time as the ESA.105 For the past thirty years, agencies and courts
have interpreted this language to mean that agencies should use
cost-benefit analysis when possible.106
To measure benefits of proposed regulations, the EPA
typically relies on studies that evaluate how much a relevant
104. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § A.
105. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (Clean Air Act analysis provisions for
new motor vehicle emission standards); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (same for
Clean Water Act effluent permits).
106. See Mortality Risk Valuation, EPA, https://perma.cc/V3KM-WV3H (last
updated Feb. 8. 2018).
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population would be willing to pay to achieve a change in
regulatory outcomes.107 To measure costs of proposed regulations,
the EPA often relies on data provided by regulated industries to
estimate the value of the burdens created by the new
regulations.108
For example, economic analysis of a proposed change in the
standard for particulate matter in the air showed that the
expected benefits of cleaner air and fewer premature fatalities
caused by pollutants outweigh the expected costs by about forty
to one.109 Since the EPA administers the program on air
pollution, it considered an alternative standard that would have
resulted in higher benefits but also higher costs.110 By using
economic analysis, the EPA had valuable information to help
choose between the alternatives. Even when an agency chooses
an alternative that does not have the highest net benefit, laying
out the alternatives and considering the costs and benefits of
them can be a valuable exercise in making thoughtful,
transparent decisions because the analyses are publicly
available.111
This is not to say that cost-benefit analysis is without
challenge or controversy. Measuring benefits of health and safety
regulations often involves estimating the value of saving human
lives, which can be a difficult practice because people are
fortunately not directly traded on markets.112 Economists
estimate values of saving lives by looking at market conditions
like wage premiums for risky jobs and willingness-to-pay for
safety features in consumer products.113 However, many view
107. EPA, supra note 106; see W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 19 (1992).
108. See EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 8-13 (2010),
https://perma.cc/BG8M-5SXY [hereinafter EPA GUIDELINES].
109. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE
NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER 5-71,
7-12 (2012), https://perma.cc/95H4-LFUQ [hereinafter EPA NAAQS
ANALYSIS].
110. See id. at ES-5, 7; see also EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 2 (2011) https://perma.cc/8RDV-4CZA (finding that
by 2020 the costs of the 1990 Amendments would reach an annual value of
$65 billion and the benefits nearly $2 trillion).
111. See, e.g., EPA NAAQS ANALYSIS, supra note 109.
112. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(8)(b); VISCUSI, supra note 107, at 19–20.
113. VISCUSI, supra note 107, at 19–20, 34.
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estimating the cost of saving lives as a disrespectful practice
because it appears to put a price on the value of people.114
Like the EPA, the agencies that implement the ESA are
likely to face challenges and controversy when it comes to
quantifying costs and benefits of proposed regulations. Despite
these downsides, the FWS and NMFS can benefit from the
valuable information that is provided by conducting an accurate
cost-benefit analysis of proposed critical habitat designations.
IV. MEASURING BENEFITS OF ESA REGULATIONS
The FWS and NMFS only consider narrow categories of costs
and benefits of critical habitat. This is a reasonable reading of the
ESA, but it also risks missing the forest for the trees. This Part
discusses how broader measures of costs and benefits will lead to
more accurate cost-benefit analysis that follows the guidance
provided by OIRA and parallels the practices of other agencies
that use economic analysis for environmental regulations.
A.

Measuring Costs of Critical Habitat

The FWS and NMFS estimate that the costs of critical
habitat are limited to the burdens on the agency to administer
the areas.115 Economics scholars have argued that there are real
costs to the ESA, including critical habitat designation. For
example, Professor Jason Shogren uses economic theory to show
why there are real costs to critical habitat designation for private
landowners.116 Economists Jeffrey Zabel and Robert Paterson
tried to measure the empirical effect of critical habitat
designation by looking at building permits issued in California
before and after proposal and designation of critical habitat.117
They found evidence that builders expect development to be more
expensive after land becomes critical habitat with a 37-percent
decrease in the long-run supply of housing permits.118 This
114.
115.
116.
117.

See id. at 19–22 (describing criticism of putting values on lives).
See LOGGERHEAD ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at ES-2.
See PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE ESA, supra note 11, at 54–58.
Jeffrey E. Zabel & Robert W. Paterson, The Effects of Critical Habitat
Designation on Housing Supply: An Analysis of California Housing
Construction Activity, 46 J. REGIONAL SCI. 67 (2006).
118. Id. at 68.
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indicates that, at least on the cost side, the designation of critical
habitat matters in the market. I use the estimates of the
magnitude of the costs of critical habitat in Part V to help
calibrate the scope of benefit estimates.
Regulated industries and their trade associations tend to
have strong incentives to quantify the estimated costs of proposed
regulations and publicize those as part of their efforts to avoid or
weaken regulatory restrictions.119 When it comes to the ESA and
critical habitat designation, groups like the American Forest
Products Association, the American Builders Association, and the
Oil and Gas Production Alliance are likely to be vocal with their
(perhaps exaggerated) estimates of the costs.120 Because
measuring costs is usually more straightforward than measuring
benefits and there are already well-informed parties that have
incentives to provide estimates of expected costs, I focus on the
more vexing issue of how to measure benefits of ESA critical
habitat.
B. Measuring Benefit Values of Listed Species
Following Circular A-4, the starting point for measuring the
benefits of ESA regulation is to use estimates of what people are
willing to pay for the survival and recovery of the listed
species.121 The benefit of the existence and revival of species can
be measured through willingness-to-pay studies.122 These studies
use various techniques to elicit from members of a relevant
119. See ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 76, at 156 (describing industry
incentive to provide cost estimate and perhaps inflate estimates); Everett
Rosenfeld, Feds Take on Fracking: What Will it Cost Drillers? CNBC
(March 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/259U-2HFH (example of industry
groups publicizing cost estimates in the popular media).
120. See Salzman, supra note 20, at 335–37; see also Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n
v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1216
(2011) (upholding FWS’s designation of critical habitat despite industry
challenge to designation’s economic impact); Home Builders Ass’n of N.
Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding FWS’s
critical-habitat designation valid despite industry
allegation that designation “failed to properly account for the economic
impact . . . “).
121. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(2).
122. See Leslie Richardson & John Loomis, The Total Economic Value of
Threatened, Endangered and Rare Species: An Updated Meta-Analysis, 68
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1535, 1535, 1539 (2008).
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population how much they value a change in regulatory
outcomes. When species are commercially valuable, such as
salmon, estimates of benefits can be based on market prices.123
More often, however, species are not traded on markets, and
benefit estimates are derived using other methods.124 Travel-cost
studies look at how much people are willing to pay to travel to a
particular place to have an experience interacting with a natural
feature, such as how much a family is willing to pay to experience
a whale sightseeing tour.125 Willingness-to-pay for travel can be
used to quantify how much people value the experience of seeing
the whales.126 This can give researchers a sense for how much
people value the existence and success of the species itself.127
Stated-preference studies use surveys to ask people from
relevant populations how much they are willing to pay for
changes in regulatory outcomes.128 Stated-preference studies
have the benefit of being flexible and allowing researchers to
capture values for a range of species and scenarios, but the
studies require careful attention to details like wording of
questions.129 Otherwise, estimates can vary greatly with small
changes in methodology.130 Despite this drawback, statedpreference surveys are the most common way to measure benefits
of endangered species because they are the only way to capture
values for some species.131 For example, there are no market
123. Id. at 1539, 1541.
124. E.g., id. at 1539 (another method includes benefit transfer).
125. See Matthew J. Kotchen & Stephen D. Reiling, Estimating and
Questioning Economic Values for Endangered Species: An Application and
Discussion, 15 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 77, 79 (1998).
126. See John Loomis, Shizuka Yorizane & Doug Larson, Testing Significance of
Multi-Destination and Multi-Purpose Trip Effects in a Travel Cost Method
Demand Model for Whale Watching Trips, 29 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON.
REV. 183 (2000).
127. See id.
128. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(4) (“The distinguishing feature of [statedpreference studies] is that hypothetical questions about use or non-use
values are posed to survey respondents in order to obtain willingness-topay estimates relevant to benefit or cost estimation.”).
129. See id.
130. Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 – Appendix I: Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation, 58
Fed. Reg. 4601, 4603–04 (Jan. 15, 1993) [hereinafter NOAA Panel Report].
131. See Luke M. Brander et al., The Empirics of Wetland Valuation: A
Comprehensive Summary and a Meta-Analysis of the Literature, 33 ENVTL.
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prices to signal the value of a commercially worthless species that
people will never encounter. Yet those same people may care
about the existence of a bird in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge that fits this description, even if they never plan to travel
there.132 If people care enough about that bird to pay money for
its protection, then those values should count as benefits of
regulatory protections for the bird.133
Economists have estimated values of benefits for over forty
different species.134 The average respondent in the studies was
willing to pay an amount (in 2003 dollars) ranging from roughly
$10 to save the Atlantic salmon in Maine to over $200 to prevent
the extinction of the humpback whale.135 These studies can be
used to calculate benefit values of protecting the species by
extrapolating the survey responses over the relevant
populations.136
Existing studies that measure willingness-to-pay for species
protection provide starting points to estimate the benefits of
protecting a species’ critical habitat. Although a new study for
each species is ideal to estimate the benefits of protecting species,
this can be cost and time prohibitive.137 Fortunately, it is not
necessary to conduct a new study for each species in each specific
location; benefits transfer measures can lead to reasonable
estimates of benefits of saving species that have not been directly
studied.138 OIRA’s Circular A-4 recommends estimating benefits
by using transfer calculations, which provide systematic ways to

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

& RESOURCE ECON. 223, 228–29 (2006) (describing estimating benefits of
wetlands, which share many of the challenges—like a lack of observable
market behavior—as measuring benefits of endangered species).
See Kotchen, supra note 125, at 78 (discussing how individuals derive
“nonuse” value from simply knowing that a species is protected despite not
having any live interaction with the species).
Id. at 78–79.
KRISTY WALLMO, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., THREATENED AND
ENDANGERED SPECIES VALUATION: LITERATURE REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 1
(2002).
Id. at 7–10.
See Robert J. Johnston et al., Contemporary Guidance for Stated Preference
Studies, 4 J. ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 319, 341 (2017).
EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 86 (2000).
Id. But see CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(5) (stating that transfer
benefits have a greater chance of uncertainty and should be used as a last
resort with explicit justification).
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gather estimates from different contexts and use them to
estimate benefits in a new context.139
C. Measuring Benefits Values of Habitats with
Ecosystem Services
This section describes the importance of implementing
economic analysis with a broad sense of benefits. Benefits of
endangered species are not limited to the values people place on
the listed species themselves, however. The ESA is intended to
protect endangered species and the habitats upon which they
depend.140 The benefits of these protections should not be limited
to the benefits of the species that are listed under the ESA; when
ecosystems are conserved because of the ESA, the benefits that
flow from those ecosystems to people should all be counted as
benefits of the regulation. For critical-habitat designation, this
can be done by using measures of ecosystem services like water
filtration and carbon sequestration.141
One way to interpret the language of the ESA is to consider
the economic benefits that flow from the listed species and the
ecosystems that are conserved because of the listed species. The
conflict between loggers and environmentalists in the Pacific
Northwest is not just about the listed Northern Spotted Owl; it is
also about how we choose to balance economic values of
harvesting old-growth timber versus the values of preserving
these ecosystems that are unlikely to reappear if destroyed. There
is an imbalance in current valuation techniques where the full
economic value of harvesting timber is measured but the value of
protecting the old-growth forest is limited to the benefits that
accrue to a few rare species. A reasonable way to gauge the
benefits of endangered species and their habitats is to use
economic valuation tools from other fields. Ecologists think of the
139. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(5) (explaining that benefit transfer
involves transferring existing costs and benefits from other original studies
and applying data in a new context).
140. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018) (“The purpose[] of [the ESA is] to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved . . . .).
141. See Claude Gascon et al., The Importance and Benefits of Species, 25
CURRENT BIOLOGY 431, 433 (2015) (describing unexpected benefits, such as
water filtration and carbon sequestration, of protecting species and their
habitats).
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benefits that flow from ecosystems to people as ecosystem
services.142 Economists use various techniques to put values on
these streams of services.143 Using existing estimates of
ecosystem services, the FWS and NMFS can start to quantify the
benefits from the ecosystems upon which endangered species
depend.
When the EPA evaluates benefits of air or water regulations,
it measures the benefits of reducing the pollutant at issue.144 The
agency also measures the benefits of lowering co-pollutants—
other pollutants that are not the direct subject of a regulation but
that are nevertheless predicted to decrease due to the
regulation.145 For example, with air regulations to limit emissions
of NO2 we also see drops in particulate matter and ground-level
ozone.146 Thus, the EPA estimates the benefits of lives saved both
from reduced NOx and from reduced ozone.147
The FWS and NMFS should follow suit and measure cobenefits of conservation efforts to capture the full range of
benefits of critical habitat designation. They have done this a few
times in the past when multiple listed species have overlapping
critical habitats, like with the Spotted Owl and salmon in the
Pacific Northwest.148 But this still fails to capture all the benefits
of the regulations, just as the EPA failing to consider reductions
in co-pollutants would not capture the full range of benefits for
regulations that reduce NOx. The most accurate way to record
benefits of critical habitat protection is to measure the benefits of
critical habitat to listed species but also factor in a category of
benefits from the conserved ecosystems.
The most promising way to measure benefits of critical
habitat designation is to use metrics of ecosystem services—
142. James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 887–88
(1997).
143. For a survey of such valuation techniques, see Richardson & Loomis, supra
note 126, at 1535, 1539.
144. See, e.g., EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 108, at 7-3 to 7-4 (describing how to
determine benefit categories of standard EPA regulations).
145. EPA, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (RIA) FOR THE NO2 NATIONAL
AMBIENT
AIR
QUALITY
STANDARDS
(NAAQS)
4-15
(2010),
https://perma.cc/Q8YK-Z8VS.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 2-4.
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carbon sequestration, water filtration and retention, and
recreational values of critical habitat—in addition to the
existence values of the species themselves. These services greatly
benefit people who enjoy clean air, filtered water, and scenic
vistas.149 Professor Gretchen Daily and others have quantified
the value of some of these ecosystem services by combining
economic and ecological tools.150 Agencies can use these
previously published valuations for ecosystem services to provide
an estimate of the benefits that flow because of the protection of
critical habitat for endangered species. Going forward, agencies
can also encourage more valuation efforts of other ecosystem
service benefits.
Not all of the benefits from ecosystems designated as critical
habitat should be counted as benefits of such designation. Taken
to an extreme, that estimate would approach the property value
of the entire critical habitat areas. Paradoxically, if the
government considers all of these values as conservation benefits,
it would sometimes also have to count those same values as
regulation costs because private landowners would be deprived of
other intended uses of the property.151 But this paradox is
avoided if only the benefit of additional conservation from criticalhabitat designation for the endangered species is considered.152
Measuring the benefits of an old-growth ecosystem in the
Pacific Northwest is not a simple accounting task because most of
these benefits are not traded on markets with prices.153
Sometimes economists can estimate how those ecosystem services
are used in production of goods and services in the market.154
149. See Gascon et al., supra note 141, at 433–34.
150. See NATURAL CAPITAL: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MAPPING ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES 213 (Gretchen C. Daily et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter NATURAL
CAPITAL].
151. See Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon: The
Law and Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 19–
20 (1997) (explaining how the protection of endangered species and critical
habitat under the ESA could preempt local zoning authority by limiting
control over private and public development projects).
152. See Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a
takings claim against FWS’s rejection of petitioner’s incidental take permit
pursuant to FWS’s designation of 40 out of petitioner’s 200 acres of land as
critical habitat).
153. See Gascon et al, supra note 141, at 431.
154. See NATURAL CAPITAL, supra note 150, at 44.
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This can allow for backing out valuations that are based on
market prices.155 So for something like water filtration,
economists might look at clean water as an input of industries
that rely on water, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and
recreation.156 One of the ways to value something like water
filtration is to look at what it would cost to filter it with human
technology.157 Ecosystem services can also be valued with statedpreference studies, much like the benefits of species existence.158
Economists have used such studies to estimate the values of
carbon sequestration, water filtration, and a range of other
services. For example, Professor Edward Barbier has estimated
and critiqued valuations of ecosystem services for coastal
wetlands determined using stated-preference studies.159
By accurately measuring the costs and benefits of critical
habitat, the FWS and NMFS can focus conservation efforts on
proposed actions that achieve high net benefits to society. This
suggestion is more than a pipe dream because existing estimates
of the values of species and ecosystem services can be used to
improve the accuracy of economic analysis in the short term. In
the long term, additional studies can provide more data points to
allow for accurate quantification of costs and benefits for
additional species and situations.
V.

EXAMPLE: CRITICAL HABITAT FOR
LOGGERHEAD TURTLES

This Part provides an example of how to implement the
proposed benefit measures by examining the recent economic
analysis for the Northwest Atlantic population segment of
loggerhead turtles. As discussed below, the NMFS estimates the
benefits of designating critical habitat along almost one third of
the Atlantic coast of the United States to be approximately zero. I
use existing estimates of the benefits of protecting the turtle and
the value of ecosystem services provided by the critical habitat to
calculate a more accurate estimate of the benefits that flow from
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Edward B. Barbier, Valuing Ecosystem Services for Coastal Wetland
Protection and Restoration, 2 RESOURCES 213 (2013).
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critical habitat designation. I estimate benefits of critical habitat
designation for the North Atlantic population segment of
loggerhead turtles to be at least $106 million per year.
A.

Current FWS Economic Analysis

Critical habitat consists of “specific areas” that are “essential
to the conservation of the species.”160 In the case of the
loggerhead turtle, critical habitat includes the scenic coastal
islands described above and the species of those islands that are
connected to loggerhead turtles through the complex web of
life.161 Loggerhead turtles also rely on the shallow waters and
bays scattered along much of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the
United States, so these marine ecosystems are proposed for
designation as critical habitat by the NMFS.162 Also included in
NMFS’s proposal for critical-habitat designation are the midocean plateaus near which loggerhead turtles find much of their
food.163 In total, about half of the coastal zone of the Southeast is
proposed critical habitat for loggerhead turtles under either FWS
or NMFS control.164 Therefore, much area and many important
ecosystems are critical habitat for loggerhead turtles. However,
since the incremental approach only looks at the costs and
benefits of protections above a baseline of protections for listed
species, the estimated benefits of loggerhead turtle critical
habitat are negligible.165
The FWS estimates the costs of critical habitat by looking at
the expected administrative burdens of protecting critical
habitat.166 For the loggerhead turtle, this amounts to about
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (2018).
See LOGGERHEAD ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 1-6.
See id. at ES-6 to 7.
See id. at ES-6.
See id. at 1-12 to 13. For species like the loggerhead turtle that pass
through both marine and coastal environments during their life cycles, the
FWS and NMFS coordinate their regulation in ways that are in the best
interests of the species. See JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, J.B. RUHL & KALYANA
ROBBINS, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 141–42
(2013); see also MOU Between the EPA, FWS, and NMFS Regarding
Enhanced Coordination Under the Clean Water Act and the ESA, 66 Fed.
Reg. 11,202, 11,208 (Feb. 22, 2001).
165. See discussion of the incremental approach supra p. 316–20.
166. See LOGGERHEAD ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at ES-7.
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$110,000 per year.167 Benefits are estimated to be unclear but
negligible because there is considerable overlap between
protections of listed species and critical habitat.168 Hypothetical
benefits are mentioned and described qualitatively but are not
quantified.169
B. More Accurate Economic Analysis of Loggerhead
Turtle Critical Habitat
As discussed in Part IV, there are advantages to measuring
costs and benefits of proposed regulations using methods that
accurately reflect how society values the expected changes due to
the regulation. A more accurate estimate of the benefits of critical
habitat for the loggerhead turtle adds the values of better
outcomes for loggerhead turtle to values of other ecosystem
services that are preserved or improved by the critical habitat
designation.
There are two existing studies of willingness-to-pay for
conservation of loggerhead turtles. Wallmo and Lew use a stated
preference choice experiment on a national representative sample
to estimate a household willingness to pay of $48.75 (in 2018
dollars) per year to have loggerhead turtles recover to the point of
not needing endangered or threatened status.170 Aggregated over
roughly 117 million households in the United States,171 this leads
to a total annual benefit of nearly $5.7 billion. Since the North
Atlantic population segment has 41.8% of the world’s loggerhead
turtles,172 the benefit of saving the relevant population segment
of loggerheads is $2.4 billion per year.
Whitehead uses a contingent valuation model that accounts
for uncertainty in recovery status of loggerhead turtles, finding
that the median North Carolina household is willing to make a
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
See id. at ES-10.
See id.
Kristy Wallmo & Daniel K. Lew, Public Willingness to Pay for Recovering
and Downlisting Threatened and Endangered Marine Species, 26
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 830, 836 tbl.3 (2012) (expressing values in 2011
dollars).
171. U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
UNITED
STATES
QUICKFACTS
(2017),
https://perma.cc/3Y9Z-A8Y7.
172. Caretta caretta (Loggerhead Turtle), IUCN RED LIST, at tbl.2 (2017),
https://perma.cc/3QXY-2CYR.
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one-time payment of $59.62 to reduce the probability of extinction
to zero for the next twenty-five years for loggerhead turtles.173
Assuming this response can be extrapolated to the other states
that include loggerhead critical habitat, this leads to an
estimated willingness to pay for loggerhead turtles of $1.14
billion, or $45.6 million per year.174 Taken together, the studies
indicate a substantial range of willingness-to-pay estimates for
loggerhead turtles from $45.6 million per year to $1.8 billion per
year. To address concerns that stated preference studies may
tend to overestimate willingness-to-pay,175 I use the lower
estimate in the range.
As discussed in Part IV, the benefits of critical habitat
designation should not be limited to the listed species but should
also include benefits of ecosystem services of the critical habitat.
Economists, often teamed with ecologists, have estimated
valuations of ecosystem services for wetlands using statedpreference studies.176 Costanza et al. estimate that the ecosystem
service of reducing storm surge provides an annual benefit of
approximately $9,671 per hectare of coastal wetland.177 With
approximately 282,426 hectares of coastal wetlands in the states
covered by the loggerhead analysis,178 this amounts to $2.7 billion
in annual benefits. Sandy intertidal beaches provide the
ecosystem service of stabilizing sediment,179 which Huang et al.
estimated to be worth around $5.45 annually per household per
mile of shore.180 The loggerhead analysis covers 1,300 miles of
173. John C. Whitehead, Ex Ante Willingness to Pay with Supply and Demand
Uncertainty: Implications for Valuing a Sea Turtle Protection Programme,
24 APPLIED ECON. 981, 984 (1992) (estimating willingness to pay as $33.22
in 1992 dollars, converted to 2018 dollars using the Consumer Price Index).
174. $59.62 per household × 19.1 million housing units in North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
supra note 171.
175. See NOAA Panel Report, supra note 130, at 4603–04.
176. See Barbier, supra note 159.
177. Robert Costanza et al, The Value of Coastal Wetlands for Hurricane
Protection, 37 AMBIO 241, 245 (2008) (Table 3 estimate of mean value of
$8,236 per hectare in 2008 dollars converted to 2018 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index).
178. Id. (using wetland area of the average storm swath for Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina from Table 3).
179. W.J. MITSCH & J.G. GOSSELINK, WETLANDS AND COASTS 166 (3d ed. 2000).
180. Ju-Chin Huang, P. Joan Poor & Min Qiang Zhao, Economic Valuation of
Beach Erosion Control, 22 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 221, 235 (2007) (listing
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beaches and 19.1 million households, resulting in $135 million in
annual benefits.
But not all of these turtles, beaches, and wetlands would be
destroyed without critical habitat designation, so we must
determine how much would have been protected in a no-action
alternative. As discussed in Part II, the increment of protections
of critical habitat has to be measured against the baseline of what
would have been protected in a no-action alternative.181 The
Zabel and Paterson results discussed in Part IV suggest that
critical habitat designation can lead to a 37% drop in construction
activity.182 Although this estimate is looking at the cost side of
critical habitat designation, there is a close link between the
opportunity costs of foregone development and the benefits of
preserving an area as critical habitat. Namely, foregone
development is likely to result in more natural environments and
vice versa. Using this as a rough proxy of the impact of critical
habitat on conservation behavior and discounting by a factor of
ten because not all development will result in complete
destruction of coastal amenities, I estimate that 3.7% of the
values discussed above would be protected because of critical
habitat designation. This results in a preliminary estimate of the
benefits of critical habitat designation for loggerhead turtles in
the Southeast of $106 million per year.183
As studies provide valuations of additional services like
shoreline recreation, the estimates of benefits can include those
quantified ecosystem services as well. For now, the benefit
measures can be thought of as lower bounds on the measures of
benefits that flow from critical habitat. The estimate of $106
million per year of critical habitat for the North Atlantic
population segment of loggerhead turtle more accurately reflects
their preferred estimate for economic benefit per mile per household as
$4.45 in 2007 dollars, converted to 2018 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index).
181. See supra Part II.D.
182. See Zabel & Paterson, supra note 117, at 68.
183. This was calculated by summing the conservative estimated benefit of
saving loggerhead turtles ($45.6 million per year), the estimated benefit of
reduced storm surge ($2.7 billion per year), and the estimated benefit of
shore stabilization ($135 million per year), and then multiplying that sum
by the estimated protection factor afforded by critical-habitat designation
(0.037).
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social preferences for turtles and benefits of coastal areas than
the FWS estimate of approximately zero benefit for this
designation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Part concludes with a discussion of how accurate
economic analysis of critical habitat designation can help improve
the discourse about the ESA by focusing the discussion on the
tradeoffs that are at the heart of the Act.
As discussed above, the FWS and NMFS should engage in
more accurate economic analysis when designating critical
habitat under the ESA—it is a better fit with the language of the
statute and can help lead to more effective regulations. Following
these suggestions would put the FWS and NMFS more in line
with White House guidance and practices of other agencies that
implement environmental laws. FWS and NMFS have made
policy choices to 1) only consider incremental effects of critical
habitat; and 2) value only the benefits that come from the listed
species themselves. I argue that the agencies should reverse
course on these two policies and promulgate a new rule that
establishes a methodology of economic analysis that fulfills
Congress’s call to consider economic factors when designating
critical habitat.184 Benefits should be measured by looking at the
value of listed species and the value of ecosystem services
protected through critical habitat designation.
As seen with the example of the economic analysis of the
loggerhead turtle, the tools for more accurate economic analysis
are within reach. Current practices of the FWS and NMFS do not
accurately capture the real costs and broad benefits that reflect
social feelings about the tradeoff between conservation and
development. Additionally, economic analysis can be a tool that
allows the FWS and NMFS to keep conserving beautiful places
but remove the worst of the burdens on landowners. By focusing
first on regulations that provide large net benefits, the agencies
can avoid some of the extreme results that prompt pushback to
the ESA.
Climate change is likely to increase the stakes of endangered
species regulation by straining both ecological and economic
184. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018).
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systems. With this additional stress, it will be crucial for the FWS
and NMFS to be able to point to how their proposed regulations
are benefiting society. Although some find it distasteful to try to
put a price on nature, failing to do so often means that only
opponents of conservation have numbers to wave in front of
Congressional committees and the press. If the agencies that
implement the ESA engage in accurate cost-benefit analysis, all
sides of the argument can have more information to use when
making decisions about how to best balance the conservation of
resources against other social goals. Agency actions can be more
transparent by clearly laying out proposed actions, alternatives,
and estimated costs and benefits.
All of these factors can help improve the discourse about the
ESA by shifting from arguments about owls versus jobs to
meaningful discussions about how to use ecosystems that are
critical to improving outcomes for species and provide valuable
products and services to people. Both the turtles and tourists on
the beach can better enjoy the beautiful landscapes of Cape
Hatteras—and hundreds of other places in the United States—
with the help of accurate economic analysis that promotes
effective protection of critical habitats.
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